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Abstract
Derivative longevity risk solutions, such as bespoke and indexed longevity swaps, allow
pension schemes and annuity providers to swap out longevity risk, but introduce coun-
terparty credit risk, which can be mitigated if not fully eliminated by collateralization.
We examine the impact of bilateral default risk and collateral rules on the marking to
market of longevity swaps, and show how longevity swap rates must be determined en-
dogenously from the collateral flows associated with the marking-to-market procedure.
For typical interest rate and mortality parameters, we find that the impact of collat-
eralization is modest in the presence of symmetric default risk, but more pronounced
when default risk and/or collateral rules are asymmetric. Our results suggest that
the overall cost of collateralization is comparable with, and often much smaller than,
that found in the interest-rate swaps market, which may then provide the appropriate
reference framework for the credit enhancement of both indemnity-based and indexed
longevity risk solutions.
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1 Introduction
The market for longevity-linked securities and derivatives has recently experienced a surge
in transactions in longevity swaps (Blake et al., 2013). These pure longevity hedges are
agreements between two parties to exchange ﬁxed payments against variable payments
linked to the number of survivors in a reference population (see Dowd et al., 2006). Table 1
presents a list of recent deals that have been publicly disclosed. So far, transactions have
mainly involved pension funds and annuity providers wanting to hedge their exposure to
longevity risk1 but without having to bear any basis risk. The variable payments in such
longevity swaps are designed to match precisely the mortality experience of each individual
hedger: hence the name bespoke longevity swaps. This is essentially a form of longevity
risk insurance, similar to annuity reinsurance in reinsurance markets. Indeed, most of the
longevity swaps executed to date have been bespoke, indemnity-based swaps of the kind
familiar in reinsurance markets. This is true despite the fact that some of the swaps listed
in table 1 have been arranged by investment banks: the banks have worked with insurance
companies (in some cases insurance company subsidiaries) in order to deliver a solution
in a format familiar to the counterparty. A fundamental diﬀerence from other forms of
reinsurance, however, is that longevity swaps are typically collateralized, whereas typical
insurance/reinsurance transactions are not.2 The main reason is that longevity swaps are
often part of a wider de-risking strategy involving other collateralized instruments (interest-
rate and inﬂation swaps, for example), and also the fact that hedgers have been increasingly
concerned with counterparty risk3 in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09.
In this article, we provide a framework to quantify the trade-oﬀ between the exposure to
counterparty risk in longevity swaps and the cost of credit enhancement strategies such as
collateralization.
1By longevity risk we mean exposure to the systematic risk of mortality improvements, which cannot
be mitigated by pooling together large numbers of lives.
2One rationale for this is that reinsurers aggregate several uncorrelated risks and pool-
ing/diversification benefits compensate for the absence of collateral (e.g., Cummins and Trainar, 2009;
Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2012; Kessler, 2013). Insurers/reinsurers are still required by their regulators to
post regulatory or solvency capital which plays a similar role to collateral but at aggregate level.
3Basel II (2006, Annex 4) defines counterparty risk as ‘the risk that the counterparty to a transaction
could default before the final settlement of the transaction’s cash flows’. The recent Solvency II proposal
makes explicit allowance for a counterparty risk module in its ‘standard formula’ approach; see CEIOPS
(2009).
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As there is no accepted framework yet for marking to market/model longevity swaps,
hedgers and hedge suppliers look to other markets to provide a reference model for coun-
terparty risk assessment and mitigation. In interest-rate swap markets, for example, the
most common form of credit enhancement is the posting of collateral. According to the
International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) almost every swap at major ﬁnan-
cial institutions is ‘bilaterally’ collateralized (ISDA, 2010a), meaning that either party is
required to post collateral depending on whether the market value of the swap is positive
or negative.4 The vast majority of transactions is collateralized according to the Credit
Support Annex (CSA) to the Master Swap Agreement introduced by ISDA (1994). The
Global Financial Crisis highlighted the importance of bilateral counterparty risk and collat-
eralization for over-the-counter markets, spurring a number of responses (e.g, ISDA, 2009;
Brigo and Capponi, 2009; Assefa et al., 2010; Brigo et al., 2011, 2012). The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (signed into law by President Barack
Obama on July 21, 2010) is likely to have a major impact on the way ﬁnancial institu-
tions will manage counterparty risk in the coming years.5 The recently established Life
and Longevity Markets Association (LLMA) 6 has counterparty risk at the center of its
agenda, and will certainly draw extensively from the experience garnered in ﬁxed-income
and credit markets.
Collateralization strategies address the concerns aired by pension trustees regarding
the eﬃcacy of longevity swaps, but introduce another dimension in the traditional pric-
ing framework used for insurance transactions. The ‘insurance premium’ embedded in a
longevity swap rate reﬂects not only the aversion/appetite of the counterparties for the risk
being transferred and the cost of regulatory capital involved in the transaction, but also
the expected costs to be incurred from posting collateral during the life of the swap. To
understand these costs, let us ﬁrst take the perspective of a hedge supplier (reinsurer or
investment bank) issuing a collateralized longevity swap to a counterparty (pension fund
4‘Unlike a firm’s exposure to credit risk through a loan, where the exposure to credit risk is unilateral
and only the lending bank faces the risk of loss, counterparty credit risk creates a bilateral risk of loss:
the market value of the transaction can be positive or negative to either counterparty to the transaction.
The market value is uncertain and can vary over time with the movement of underlying market factors.’
(Basel II, 2006, Annex 4).
5See, for example, ‘Berkshire may scale back derivative sales after Dodd-Frank’, Bloomberg, August 10,
2010.
6See http://www.llma.org.
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or annuity provider). Whenever the swap is suﬃciently out-of-the-money to the hedge sup-
plier, the hedge supplier is required to post collateral, which can be used by the hedger to
mitigate losses in the event of default. Although interest on collateral is typically rebated,
there is both a funding cost and an opportunity cost, as the posting of collateral depletes
the resources the hedge supplier can use to meet her capital requirements at aggregate
level as well as to write additional business. On the other hand, whenever the swap is suf-
ﬁciently in-the-money to the hedge supplier, the hedge supplier will receive collateral from
the counterparty, thus beneﬁting from capital relief in regulatory valuations and freeing
up capital that can be used to sell additional longevity protection. The beneﬁts can be
far larger if collateral can be re-pledged for other purposes, as in the interest-rate swaps
market.7 The same considerations can be made from the viewpoint of the hedger, but the
funding needs and opportunity costs of the two parties are unlikely to oﬀset each other
exactly. This is particularly relevant for transactions involving parties subject to diﬀerent
regulatory frameworks. In the UK and several other countries, for example, longevity risk
exposures are more capital intensive for hedge suppliers, such as insurers, than for pension
funds.8
In the absence of collateral, and ignoring longevity risk aversion, swap rates9 depend
on best estimate survival probabilities for the hedged population and on the degree of
covariation between the ﬂoating leg of the swap and the defaultable term structure of
interest rates facing the hedger and the hedge supplier. This means that a proper analysis
of a longevity swap cannot disregard the sponsor’s covenant when the hedger is a pension
plan (see section 3 below). In the presence of collateralization, longevity swap rates are also
shaped by the expected collateral costs, and swap valuation formulae involve a discount
rate reﬂecting the cost of collateral. As a result, default-free valuation formulae are not
appropriate even in the presence of full collateralization and the corresponding absence of
default losses.10
7According to ISDA (2010a), the vast majority of collateral is rehypothecated for other purposes in
interest-rate swap markets. Currently, collateral can be re-pledged under the New York Credit Support
Annex, but not under the English Credit Support Deed (see ISDA, 2010b).
8This asymmetry is, in part, a by-product of rules allowing, for example, pension liabilities to be
quantified by using outdated mortality tables or discount rates reflecting optimistic expected returns.
9Defined as the rates in the fixed legs of the swap zeroing its market value at inception.
10See Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) for the case of symmetric default risk and full collateralization in
interest-rate swaps.
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We quantify collateral costs in two ways: i) in terms of funding costs that are incurred
or mitigated when collateral is posted or received, and ii) as the opportunity cost of selling
additional longevity protection. In both cases, we ﬁnd that, for typical interest rate and
mortality parameters, the impact of collateralization on swap rates is modest when default
risk and collateral rules are symmetric. The main reason is that longevity risk and interest-
rate risk have countervailing eﬀects that dilute the overall impact of collateralization on
swap rates:
i) On the one hand, the receiver of the ﬁxed survival rate (the hedge supplier) posts
collateral when mortality is lower and hence longevity exposures are more capital intensive.
On the other hand, she receives collateral when mortality is higher and longevity protection
is less capital intensive. The overall eﬀect is to push swap rates higher, to compensate the
hedge supplier for the positive dependence between collateral posting and capital costs.
ii) When the hedger or hedge supplier is out-of-the-money, collateral outﬂows are larger
in low interest rate environments (i.e., when liabilities are discounted at a lower rate), hence
there is a negative relationship between the amount of collateral posted and the counter-
parties’ funding/opportunity costs. This mitigates the overall impact of collateralization
on longevity swap rates.
When default risk and/or collateral rules are asymmetric, the opposing eﬀects are of
diﬀerent magnitudes and, as a result, the impact of collateral costs on longevity swap rates
is larger. For example, we ﬁnd that swap rates decrease substantially when the hedger
has a lower credit standing (i.e., higher funding costs) and full collateralization is used, or
when collateral rules are more favorable to the hedge supplier. Although collateralization
introduces an explicit link between the individual risk exposures and the hedge supplier’s
funding risk (hence some of the pooling/diversiﬁcation beneﬁts used to substitute for col-
lateralization in the standard insurance model may be lost), in our examples we ﬁnd that
the opposite eﬀects of longevity and interest rate risk, and the diﬀerent nature of the risk
on which the swap is written (a ﬂoating rate in the case of interest-rate swaps, a smoother
survival curve in the case of longevity swaps) make the overall impact of collateraliza-
tion comparable with, and typically lower than, that observed in ﬁxed-income markets
(e.g., Johannes and Sundaresan, 2007). An important implication is that the interest-rate
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swaps market might provide an appropriate framework for the collateralization of bespoke
longevity solutions, even though such solutions lack of the transparency and standard-
ization beneﬁts associated with indexed-based instruments. Investment banks have sold
index-based longevity swaps which have a structure that would be more familiar to capital
markets investors, but they have so far been less popular than bespoke solutions to date.
On the methodological side, we show how longevity swap rates must be determined
endogenously from the dynamic marking to market11 of the swap and the collateral rules
speciﬁed by the contract. To see why, note that the market value of the swap at each
valuation date depends on the evolution of the relevant state variables (mortality, interest
rates, credit spreads), as well as on the swap rate locked in at inception. On the other
hand, the swap’s market value will typically aﬀect collateral amounts and, in a setting
where collateral is costly, will embed the market value of the costs associated with future
collateral ﬂows. Hence, the swap rate can only be determined by explicitly taking into
account the marking-to-market process and the dynamics of collateral posting. To avoid
the computational burden of nested Monte Carlo simulations, we use an iterative procedure
based on the Least-Squares Monte Carlo (LSMC) approach12 (see Glassermann, 2004,
and references therein). We provide several numerical examples showing how diﬀerent
collateralization rules shape longevity swap rates giving rise to margins in (best estimate)
survival probabilities reﬂecting the cost of future collateral ﬂows. Although our focus is
on longevity risk solutions, the approach can be applied to other instruments, such as
over-the-counter solutions for inﬂation and credit risk.
Our work contributes to the existing literature on longevity risk pricing in at least three
ways: i) we introduce default risk in the pricing of longevity risk solutions, and properly
address its bilateral nature; ii) we explicitly allow for collateralization rules, which are the
backbone of any real-world hedging solution and materially aﬀect the pricing of over-the-
counter transactions; iii) we introduce a ‘structural’ dimension in an otherwise reduced-form
11Here and in what follows, by ‘market value’ and ‘marking to market’ we mean that assets and liabilities
are valued according to a market-consistent valuation model or regulatory standard.
12A similar approach is used by Bacinello et al. (2009, 2010) for surrender guarantees in life policies and
by Bauer et al. (2009) for the computation of capital requirements within the Solvency II framework. The
term American Monte Carlo is often used in financial engineering to refer to this approach. We stick to the
term Least Squares Monte Carlo, as it is more common in the insurance industry (e.g., Hörig and Leitschkis,
2012).
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pricing framework, by allowing for funding/opportunity costs associated with longevity risk
exposures held by hedgers and hedge suppliers. As there is essentially no publicly available
information on swap rates, our approach13 has the advantage of using publicly available
information on credit markets and regulatory standards, without having to rely exclusively
on calibration to primary insurance market prices, approximate hedging methods or as-
sumptions on agents’ risk preferences (e.g., Dowd et al., 2006; Ludkovski and Young, 2008;
Bauer et al., 2012, 2010; Biﬃs et al., 2010; Chen and Cummins, 2010; Cox et al., 2010;
Deng et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013, among others).
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce longevity swaps
and formalize their payoﬀs. Although the setup covers the case of both bespoke and index-
based swaps, we focus on the former to keep the paper focused. In section 2.1, we examine
the marking to market of a longevity swap during its lifetime to demonstrate the impact
of counterparty risk on the hedger’s balance sheet. Section 3 introduces bilateral default
risk in longevity swap valuation formulae, identifying the main channels through which
default risk aﬀects the market value of swaps. Section 4 introduces credit enhancement in
the form of collateralization, and shows how longevity swap rates are aﬀected even in the
presence of full cash collateralization (and hence absence of default losses). We compute
swap rates by using an iterative procedure based on the LSMC approach. In section 5,
several stylized examples are provided to understand how diﬀerent collateralization rules
may aﬀect longevity swap rates. Concluding remarks are oﬀered in section 6. Further
details and technical remarks are collected in an appendix.
< Table 1 about here >
2 Longevity swaps
We consider a hedger (insurer selling annuities, pension fund), referred to as party h,
and a hedge supplier (reinsurer, investment bank), referred to as counterparty hs. Agent
h has the obligation to pay amounts XT1 , XT2 , . . ., possibly dependent on interest rates
13Similarly, Biffis and Blake (2010b, 2013) endogenize longevity risk premia by introducing asymmetric
information and capital requirements in a risk-neutral setting.
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and inﬂation, to each survivor at ﬁxed dates 0 < T1 ≤ T2, . . . of an initial population of
n individuals (annuitants or pensioners) alive at time zero. We are clearly restricting our
attention to homogeneous liabilities for ease of exposition, more general situations requiring
obvious modiﬁcations. Party h’s liability at a generic payment date T > 0 is given by the
random variable (n − NT )XT , where NT counts the number of deaths experienced by
the population during the period [0, T ]. Assuming that the individuals’ death times have
common intensity14 (µt)t≥0, the expected number of survivors at time T can be written as
EP [n−NT ] = npT , with the survival probability pT given by (see the appendix)
pT := E
P
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
µtdt
)]
. (2.1)
Here and in the following, P denotes the real-world probability measure. The intensity
could be modeled by using, for example, any of the stochastic mortality models considered
in Cairns et al. (2009). For our examples, we will rely on the simple Lee-Carter mortality
projection model (Lee and Carter, 1992).
Let us now consider a ﬁnancial market and introduce the risk-free rate process (rt)t≥0
(in practice, an overnight rate). We assume that a market-consistent price of the liabilities
can be computed by using a risk-neutral measure P˜, equivalent to P, such that the death
times have the same intensity process (µt)t≥0 (with diﬀerent dynamics, in general, under
the two measures; see Biﬃs et al., 2010). The time-0 market value of the aggregate liability
can then be written as
EP˜
[∑
i
exp
(
−
∫ Ti
0
rtdt
)
(n−NTi)XTi
]
= n
∑
i
EP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ Ti
0
(rt + µt)dt
)
XTi
]
.
For the moment, we take the pricing measure as given: we will give it more structure later
on.
We consider two instruments which h can enter into with hs to hedge its exposure: a
bespoke longevity swap and an index-based longevity swap. In these swaps, in contrast
with interest rate swaps, the ﬁxed leg will be a series of ﬁxed rates each one pertaining
14As discussed more in detail in the appendix, for tractability we restrict our attention to the case of
doubly stochastic (or Cox, conditionally Poisson) death times; see Biffis et al. (2010).
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to an individual payment date. The reason is that mortality increases substantially at old
ages and a single ﬁxed rate would introduce a growing mismatch between the cashﬂows
provided by the swap and those needed by the hedger. However, as with interest rate
swaps, we can treat a longevity swap as a portfolio of forward contracts on the underlying
ﬂoating (survival) rate.15 In this section, we ignore default risk and focus on individual
payments at maturity T > 0. Throughout the article, we always assume the perspective of
the hedger.
A bespoke longevity swap allows party h to pay a ﬁxed rate pN ∈ (0, 1) against
the realized survival rate experienced by the population between time zero and time T .
Assuming a notional amount equal to the initial population size, n, the net payout to the
hedger at time T is16
n
(
n−NT
n
− pN
)
,
i.e., the diﬀerence between the realized number of survivors and the pre-set number of
survivors npN agreed at inception. Letting S0 denote the market value of the swap at
inception, we can write
S0 = nE
P˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
rtdt
)(
n−NT
n
− pN
)]
= nEP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + µt)dt
)]
− nB(0, T )pN ,
(2.2)
with B(0, T ) denoting the time-zero price of a zero-coupon bond with maturity T . By
setting S0 = 0, we obtain the swap rate as
pN = p˜T +B(0, T )
−1CovP˜
(
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
rtdt
)
, exp
(
−
∫ T
0
µtdt
))
, (2.3)
where the risk-adjusted survival probability p˜T is deﬁned as in (2.1) with expectations
taken under P˜. Expression (2.3) shows that if the intensity of mortality is uncorrelated
with bond market returns (a reasonable ﬁrst-order approximation), the longevity swap
15With a slight abuse of terminology, we use the term ‘swap rate’ for individual forward rates as well as for
swap curves (a series of swap rates). We note that swap curves are often summarized by the improvement
factor applied to the survival probabilities of a reference mortality table/model; see examples in section 5.
16For ease of exposition, here and in the following sections, we consider contemporaneous settlement
only. Other settlement conventions (e.g. in arrears) have negligible effects, but make valuation formulae
more involved when bilateral and asymmetric default risk is introduced.
curve just involves the survival probabilities {p˜Ti} relative to the diﬀerent maturities {Ti}.
Several studies have recently addressed the issue of how to quantify risk-adjusted survival
probabilities, for example, by calibration to annuity prices and books of life policies traded
in secondary markets, or by use of approximate hedging methods (see references in Sec-
tion 1). As there is essentially no publicly available information on swap rates, for our
numerical examples we will suppose a baseline case in which p˜Ti = pTi for each maturity Ti
and focus on how counterparty default risk and collateral requirements might generate a
positive or negative spread on best estimate survival rates. This is consistent with market
practice where counterparties would agree on a real-world mortality model (and estimation
methodology) to mark-to-model the swap at future dates. Although in what follows, we
mainly concentrate on longevity risk, in practice, the ﬂoating payment of a longevity swap
might involve an interbank rate component (e.g., LIBOR) or survival indexation rules dif-
ferent from the ones considered above. To keep the setup general, we will at times consider
instruments making a generic variable payment, P , and write the corresponding swap rate
p as
p = EP˜ [P ] +B(0, T )−1CovP˜
(
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
rtdt
)
, P
)
. (2.4)
The setup can easily accommodate index-based longevity swaps, standardized in-
struments allowing the hedger to pay a ﬁxed rate pI ∈ (0, 1) against the realized value
of a survival index (It)t≥0 at time T . The latter might reﬂect the mortality experience
of a reference population closely matching17 that of the liability portfolio. Examples are
represented by the LifeMetrics indices developed by J.P. Morgan, the Pensions Institute
and Towers Watson,18 or the Xpect indices developed by Deutsche Börse.19 The relative
advantages and disadvantages of index-based versus bespoke swaps are discussed, for ex-
ample, in Biﬃs and Blake (2010a). Assuming that the index admits the representation
It = exp(−
∫ t
0 µ
I
sds), with (µ
I
t )t≥0 the intensity of mortality of a reference population, the
swap rate pI is given again by expression (2.3), but with the process µ replaced by µI , and
with p˜T replaced by the corresponding risk-adjusted survival probability p˜
I
T .
17The risk of mismatch is called basis risk. See, for example, Coughlan et al. (2011), Stevens et al.
(2011), Salhi and Loisel (2012), Gatzert and Wesker (2012), and Cairns (2013) for some results related to
this risk dimension.
18See http://www.lifemetrics.com. The indices were transferred to LLMA in 2011.
19See http://www.xpect-index.com.
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2.1 The marking-to-market (MTM) process
Longevity swaps are not currently exchange traded and there is no commonly accepted
framework for counterparties to mark to market/model their positions.20 The presence of
counterparty default risk and collateralization rules, however, makes the MTM procedure a
very important feature of these transactions for at least two reasons. First, at each payment
date, the diﬀerence between the variable and pre-set payment generates a cash inﬂow or
outﬂow to the hedger, depending on the evolution of mortality. In the absence of basis risk
(which is the case for bespoke solutions), these diﬀerences show a pure ‘cashﬂow hedge’ of
the longevity exposure in operation. However, as market conditions change (e.g., mortality
patterns, counterparty default risk), the impact of the swap on the hedger’s balance sheet
can evolve dramatically. For example, even if the swap payments are expected to provide a
good hedge against longevity risk, the hedger’s position will weaken considerably if the
expected present value of the net payments shrinks due to deterioration in the hedge
supplier’s credit quality. Second, for solvency requirements, it is important to value a
longevity swap under extreme market/mortality scenarios (‘stress testing’). This means,
for example, that even if a longevity swap qualiﬁes as a liability on a market-consistent
basis, it might still provide considerable capital relief when valued on a regulatory basis
due to its recognized eﬀectiveness as a hedge.
To illustrate some of these points, let us consider the hypothetical situation of an insurer
h with a liability represented by a group of ten thousand 65-year-old annuitants drawn from
the population of England & Wales in 1980. We assume that party h entered a 25-year
pure longevity swap in 1980 and we follow the evolution of the contract until maturity.
The population is assumed to evolve according to the death rates reported in the Human
Mortality Database (HMD) for England & Wales.21 We assume that interest-rate risk is
hedged away through interest rate swaps, locking in a rate of 5% throughout the life of the
swap. The role of collateral is examined later on; here, we show how the hedging instrument
operates from the point of view of the hedger. For this bespoke solution, the market value
of each ﬂoating-for-ﬁxed payment occurring at a generic date T can be computed by using
20At the time of writing, LLMA was working on this issue.
21See http://www.mortality.org.
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the valuation formula
St =nE
P˜
t
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rsds
)(
n−Nt
n
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
µsds
))]
− nB(t, T )pN , (2.5)
for each time t in [0, T ] at which no default has yet occurred, with B(t, T ) denoting the
market value of a zero-coupon bond with time to maturity T − t, and EP˜t [·] the conditional
expectation under a pricing measure P˜, given the information available at time t. As a
simple benchmark case, we assume that market participants receive information from the
HMD and use the Lee-Carter model to value longevity-linked cashﬂows. In other words,
at each MTM date (including inception), longevity swap rates are based on Lee-Carter
forecasts computed using the latest HMD information available.22 Figure 1 illustrates the
evolution of swap survival rates for an England & Wales cohort tracked from age 65 in 1980
to age 90 in 2005. It is clear that the systematic underestimation of mortality improvements
by the Lee-Carter model in this particular example will mean that the hedger’s position
will become increasingly in-the-money as the swap matures. This is shown in ﬁgure 2. In
practice, the contract may allow the counterparty to cancel the swap or re-set the ﬁxed leg
for a nonnegative fee, but we ignore these features in this example. Figure 2 also reports
the sequence of net cashﬂows generated by the swap. As interest rate risk is hedged
away − and again ignoring default risk for the moment − cash inﬂows/outﬂows arising in
the backtesting exercise only reﬂect the diﬀerence between the realized survival rates and
the swap rates locked in at inception. On the other hand, the swap’s market value reﬂects
changes in market swap rates, which by assumption follow the updated Lee-Carter forecasts
plotted in ﬁgure 1 and diﬀer from the realized survival rates. As is evident from ﬁgure 2,
the credit exposure of a longevity swap is close to zero at inception and at maturity, but
may be sizable in between, depending on the trade-oﬀ between changes in market/mortality
conditions and the residual swap payments (amortization eﬀect). The credit exposure is
quantiﬁed by the replacement cost, i.e., the cost that the nondefaulting counterparty would
have to incur at the default time to replace the instrument at market prices then available.
As a simple example which predicts the next section, let us introduce credit risk (but no
22See Dowd et al. (2010a,b); Cairns et al. (2011) for a comprehensive analysis of alternative mortality
models; see also Girosi and King (2008) and Pitacco et al. (2009).
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default) and assume that in 1988 the credit spread of the hedge supplier widens across all
maturities by 50 and 100 basis points. The impact of these two scenarios on the hedger’s
balance sheet is dramatic, as shown in ﬁgures 2-3, demonstrating how MTM proﬁts and
losses can jeopardize a successful cashﬂow hedge.
< Figure 1 about here >
< Figure 2 about here >
< Figure 3 about here >
3 Counterparty default risk
The backtesting exercise of the previous section has demonstrated the importance of the
hedge supplier’s credit risk and the marking to market procedure in assessing the value of
a longevity swap to the hedger. A correct approach, however, should allow for the fact
that counterparty risk is bilateral. This is the case even when the hedger is a pension plan.
Private sector deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans in countries such as the UK are founded on
trust law and rely on a promise by (rather than a guarantee from) the sponsoring employer
to pay the beneﬁts to plan members. This promise is known as the ‘sponsor covenant’. The
strength of the sponsor covenant depends on both the ﬁnancial strength of the employer
and the employer’s commitment to the scheme.23 As a reasonable but imperfect proxy for
the eﬀect of the sponsor covenant, we use the sponsor’s default intensity (party h’s default
intensity). For large corporate pension plans, the intensity can be derived/extrapolated
from spreads observed in corporate bond and CDS markets. For smaller plans, an analysis
of the funding level and strategy of the scheme is required.24
23In the UK, for example, The Actuarial Profession (2005, par. 3.2) defined the sponsor covenant as: “the
combination of (a) the ability and (b) the willingness of the sponsor to pay (or the ability of the trustees
to require the sponsor to pay) sufficient advance contributions to ensure that the scheme’s benefits can be
paid as they fall due.” See also The Pensions Regulator (2009).
24Along the same lines, Inkmann and Blake (2010) show how the discount rate for the valuation of
pension liabilities should reflect funding risk.
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Assume that both party h and hs may default at random times τh, τhs, admitting
default intensities25 (λht )t≥0, (λ
hs
t )t≥0. Deﬁning by τ := min(τ
h, τhs) the default time of
the swap transaction, we further assume that, on the event {τ ≤ T}, the nondefaulting
counterparty, say party i, receives a fraction ψj ∈ [0, 1] (i 6= j, with i, j ∈ {h,hs}) of
the market value of the swap before default, Sτ−, if she is in-the-money, otherwise she
has to pay the full pre-default market value Sτ− to the defaulting counterparty. Following
Duﬃe and Huang (1996), we can then write the market value of a swap with notional
amount n as
S0 =nE
P˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + 1{St<0}(1− ψ
h)λht + 1{St≥0}(1− ψ
hs)λhst )dt
)(
P − pd
)]
,
(3.1)
where P denotes the variable payment, pd the ﬁxed rate, and the indicator function 1A takes
the value of unity if the event A is true, zero otherwise. To understand the above formula,
note that, in our setting, the risk-neutral valuation of a defaultable claim involves the use
of a default-risk-adjusted short rate rt + λ
h
t + λ
hs
t and dividend payment λ
h
t (ψ
h1St−<0 +
1St−≥0)+λ
hs
t (ψ
hs1St−≥0+1St−<0) determined by the recovery rules described above. As a
result, the valuation formula (3.1) entails discounting at a spread above the risk-free rate
given by
Λt :=λ
h
t + λ
hs
t − λ
h
t (ψ
h1St<0 + 1St≥0)− λ
hs
t (ψ
hs1St≥0 + 1St<0)
=1{St<0}(1− ψ
h)λht + 1{St≥0}(1− ψ
hs)λhst ,
showing a switching-type dependence on the characteristics of the counterparty that is out-
of-the-money at each given time prior to default. The swap rate admits the representation
pd = EP˜[P ] +
CovP˜
(
exp
(
−
∫ T
0 (rt + Λt)dt
)
, P
)
EP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0 (rt + Λt)dt
)] , (3.2)
and hence depends in a complex way not only on the interaction between the variable
25For tractability and symmetry with the mortality model of section 2, we work with doubly stochastic
default times (see the appendix). The main drawback is that the occurrence of default does not affect the
conditional default probability of the surviving counterparty, thus limiting the extent to which close-out
risk can be properly modelled.
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payments and risk factors such as interest rates, default intensities and recovery rates, but
also on the path of the swap’s market value itself. When P does not include a demographic
component, as in the case of interest-rate swaps, the covariance term is typically negative.
To see this, consider the case of the standard swap valuation formula obtained by assuming
that both counterparties have the same default intensity (λt := λ
h
t = λ
hs
t ) and there is
no recovery conditional on default (ψh and ψhs are simply zero). If the credit risk of the
counterparties is equal to the average credit quality of the LIBOR panel, the discount rate
in (3.2) is simply given by r + λ, where λ is just the LIBOR-Treasury (TED) spread. For
a swap paying the LIBOR rate, we would then have a negative covariance term and hence
pd ≤ EP˜[P ]. When P only includes a demographic component (as in expression (2.3) for
example), which is uncorrelated with the other variables, we would still have a non-null
covariance term, due to the regime-switching nature of the discount rate in formula (3.2),
and the fact that switching is triggered by the value of the swap, which also depends on
the ﬂoating rate of interest. More generally, one might expect the covariance term to be
negative, as longevity-linked payments are likely to be positively correlated with the credit
quality of hedge suppliers26 and companies with signiﬁcant pension liabilities. The case of
ﬂoating payments linked to both mortality and interest rates would then suggest a swap
rate satisfying pd ≤ EP˜[P ]. In the next section, we will show that this is not necessarily
the case. To understand why, consider the case of full recovery as an example (set ψh and
ψhs equal to one): expression (3.2) reduces to a default-free risk-neutral valuation formula,
irrespective of both the default intensities of the counterparties and the costs involved by
the credit enhancement tools needed to ensure that full recovery is indeed achieved upon
default. This suggests that it is essential to consider explicitly counterparty risk mitigation
tools in the pricing functional.
Counterparty risk can be mitigated in a number of ways, for example by introducing
termination rights (e.g., credit puts and break clauses) or using credit derivatives (e.g.,
credit default swaps and credit spread options). We will focus on collateralization, a
form of direct credit support requiring each party to post cash or securities when it is
out-of-the-money. For simplicity, we consider the case of cash, which is by far the most
26This is a reasonable assumption for monoline insurers such as pension buyout firms, but might be less
so for well-diversified reinsurers.
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common type of collateral (e.g., ISDA, 2010b) and allows us to disregard close-out risk,
the risk that the value of collateral may change at default. In the interest-rate swaps mar-
ket, Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) ﬁnd evidence of costly collateral by comparing swap
market data with swap values based on portfolios of futures and forward contracts, and by
estimating a dynamic term structure model by using Treasury and swap data. We cannot
carry out a similar exercise for longevity swaps, because there are no publicly available
data on these transactions. On the other hand, we can quantify the funding/opportunity
costs associated with the collateral ﬂows originating from the MTM procedure, as will be
shown in section 5.
4 Collateralization
Collateral agreements reﬂect the amount of acceptable credit exposure that each party
agrees to take on. We consider simple collateral rules capturing the main features of the
problem. Formally, let us introduce the pre-default collateral process27 (Ct)t≥0, which
indicates how much cash, Ct, to post at each time t prior to default in response to changes
in market conditions, including, in particular, the MTM value of the swap (we provide
explicit examples below). Again, we develop our analysis from the point of view of the
hedger, so that Ct > 0 (Ct < 0) means that party h is holding (posting) collateral. Using
the notation a+ := max(a, 0) and a− := max(−a, 0), we assume the recovery rules to take
the following form:
• On the event {τh ≤ min(τhs, T )} (hedger’s default), party hs recovers any collateral
received by the hedger an instant prior to default, C−τh−, and pays the full MTM value
of the swap to party h if Sτh− ≥ 0. The net ﬂow to party h is then S
+
τh− − C
−
τh−.
• On the event {τhs ≤ min(τh, T )} (hedge supplier’s default), party h pays the full
MTM value of the swap to party hs if Sτhs− < 0, and recovers any collateral received
by hs an instant prior to default, C+τhs−. The net ﬂow to party h can then be written
as −S−τhs− + C
+
τhs−.
27In other words, the actual collateral process supporting the transaction is (1{τ>t}Ct)t≥0; hence, we are
not concerned with the value taken by Ct after default.
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• Whenever the nondefaulting counterparty, say h, is out-of-the-money, payment of
the full MTM value of the swap is accomplished by party h recovering the extra
amount (S+τ− − C
+
τ−)
+ in the case of overcollateralization, or by party h paying
the extra amount (S−τ− − C
−
τ−)
+ in case of undercollateralization. In case of full
collateralization, party h simply loses any collateral posted with hs.
To obtain neater results, it is convenient to express the collateral before default of either
party as a fraction of the MTM value of the swap,
Ct =
(
chst 1{St−≥0} + c
h
t 1{St−<0}
)
St−, (4.1)
where ch, chs are two nonnegative left-continuous processes giving the fraction of the MTM
value of the swap that is posted as collateral by party h or hs, respectively.28 Finally, we
introduce a nonnegative continuous process (δt)t≥0 representing the yield on collateral, in
the sense that holding/posting collateral of amount Ct yields/costs instantaneously the net
amount δtCt (after rebate). We can introduce some asymmetry, by setting δt = δ
h
t 1{St−<0}+
δhst 1{St−≥0}, so that δ
h
t be interpreted as party h’s net cost of posting collateral when she is
out-of-the-money, and δhst as the net yield on the collateral posted by party hs when party
h is in-the-money. In general, one may regard the collateral costs embedded in swap market
values as those of the marginal market participant. However, when considering individual
longevity swap transactions with bespoke CSAs, it may be convenient to allow the pricing
formula to take into account the cost of collateral of the counterparty: in this case δh and
δhs may be regarded as the cost of posting collateral for party h and hs whenever they are
out-of-the-money.
Denoting by pc the swap rate available in case of collateralization, we can write the
MTM value of the swap as in (3.1), but with the spread Λ now replaced by (see the
appendix for a proof)
Γt = λ
h
t (1− c
h
t )1{St<0} + λ
hs
t (1− c
hs
t )1{St≥0} −
(
δht c
h
t 1{St<0} + δ
hs
t c
hs
t 1{St≥0}
)
. (4.2)
28Note that representation (4.1) comes at a cost: we cannot encompass the case when collateral is
posted by a counterparty at inception (a form of overcollateralization), which may be the case for some
transactions.
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In the above expression, we recognize the typical features of valuation formulae for credit-
risky securities (e.g., Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2002): the ﬁrst two terms account for the
fractional recovery of the swap MTM value in case of default of the counterparty, the third
one for the costs incurred when posting collateral before default. An important diﬀerence,
however, is that in (4.2) recovery rates depend on collateral rules, and collateral costs enter
explicitly in the discount rate. We now examine simple special cases to understand better
the role of collateral in shaping swap rates.
4.1 Full collateralization
Consider the collateral rule obtained by setting ch and chs equal to one, meaning that
the full MTM value of the swap is received/posted as collateral depending on whether the
marking-to-market procedure results in a positive/negative value for St. As we consider
cash collateral, default is immaterial. In contrast with section 3, however, the expression
for the swap MTM value does not reduce to the usual default-free, risk-neutral valuation
formula in general, unless collateral costs are zero. In the case of symmetric collateral costs,
for example, we obtain:
pc = EP˜[P ] +
CovP˜
(
exp
(∫ T
0 (δt − rt)dt
)
, P
)
EP˜
[
exp
(∫ T
0 (δt − rt)dt
)] . (4.3)
If the cost of collateral is positively dependent on P , we expect the swap rate to be higher
than pd in expression (3.2) (see Johannes and Sundaresan, 2007), reﬂecting the fact that
(costly) collateralization results in the payer of the ﬂoating rate being compensated with a
higher ﬁxed rate. In the interest-rate swap market this happens for example if either the
short rate or the TED spread are positively correlated with δ. The intuition is that the
ﬂoating rate payer will have to both post collateral and incur higher funding costs when
the ﬂoating rate increases. In longevity space, one may expect the cost of collateral to
be positively dependent on mortality improvements and negatively dependent on interest
rates, as longevity-linked liabilities are more capital intensive in low mortality and low
interest rate environments (due to lower discounting of future cashﬂows). The combined
impact of these two eﬀects is ambiguous, and is discussed in the examples of section 5.
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4.2 Common collateral rules
According to ISDA (2010b), it is typical for collateral agreements to specify collateral trig-
gers based on the market value of the swap or other relevant variables (credit ratings,
credit spreads, etc.) crossing pre-speciﬁed threshold levels. In longevity swaps, the CSA
may deﬁne collateral rules that depend on the underlying mortality experience, involve path
dependence (with respect to mortality experience/expectations for instance), and monitor
diﬀerent variables at diﬀerent frequency. For example, the CSA may allow for daily collat-
eral adjustments for ﬁnancial conditions, quarterly adjustments for death experience, and
annual adjustments for changes in future mortality improvements. The following examples
illustrate some of these aspects:
a) Set chst = 1{St−≥s(t)} and c
h
t = 1{St−≤s(t)} (for continuous functions s, s deﬁned on
[0, T ] and satisfying s ≤ s), meaning that the hedge supplier (hedger) is required
to post full collateral if the swap’s MTM value is above (below) the appropriate
time-dependent threshold. More general collateral rules can be obtained by setting
chst = γ
hs
t 1{St−≥s(t)} and c
h
t = γ
h
t 1{St−≤s(t)}, for suitable processes γ
h, γhs depending
on prevailing market conditions or expectations about future mortality.
b) In longevity swaps, however, it is more common to deﬁne collateral thresholds in
terms of mortality forecasts based on a model agreed at contract inception, and
monitor the deaths in the hedger’s population instead of the market value of the
swap. This is due to both the re-estimation risk aﬀecting any given mortality model
and the presence of substantial model risk, which most likely would prevent the
counterparties from agreeing on a common model at future dates. We can set, for
example, chst = 1{Nt−≤α(t)} and c
h
t = 1{Nt−≥β(t)}, for continuous functions α and β
satisfying 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ n, meaning that the hedge supplier (hedger) is required to
post full collateral if realized deaths are below (above) the relevant threshold.
c) For an index-based swap, it may be more convenient to work with the mortality inten-
sity µI of the reference population (see section 2) and set chst = 1{
∫ t
0 µ
I
sds≤a(t)}
and cht =
1{
∫ t
0 µ
I
sds≥b(t)}
for (say) continuous functions a, b satisfying 0 ≤ a ≤ b. This means
that collateral posting is triggered at each time t if the realized value of the longevity
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index, exp(−
∫ t
0 µ
I
sds), falls outside the open interval (exp(−b(t)), exp(−a(t))).
d) As was emphasized in section 2.1, the severity of counterparty risk depends on the
credit quality of the counterparties. This is why collateralization agreements may
set collateral thresholds that explicitly depend on credit ratings or CDS spreads. A
simple example of this practice can be obtained as a special case of (a) by setting
chst = 1{Nt−≤α(t)}∪{λhst ≥λ}, c
h
t = 1{Nt−≥β(t)}∪{λht≥λ}, meaning that, at each time t, the
hedger (hedge supplier) receives collateral when either realized deaths fall below the
level α(t) (respectively β(t)) or the hedge supplier’s (respectively hedger’s) default
intensity overshoots a given threshold λ ≥ 0. Note that both ch and chs can be
non zero at the same time (for example on the event {Nt− ≤ α(t)} ∩ {λ
h
t ≥ λ}),
but expression (4.1) ensures that only the party out-of-the-money will have to post
collateral.
4.3 Computing the swap rate
The recursive nature of swap valuation formulae in the case of bilateral and asymmetric
counterparty risk (in a doubly stochastic setting) was already noted by Duﬃe and Huang
(1996). By modeling the recovery rates and the diﬀerence in counterparties’ credit spreads
in reduced form, however, they could use a simple iterative procedure to determine the swap
rate.29 Here, we explicitly allow for the impact of collateral and the MTM procedure in the
pricing functional: working in a high-dimensional Markov setting, we use a Least-Squares
Monte Carlo approach. Exploiting the properties of the doubly stochastic setup, we do not
model death/default times explicitly, but just rely on the mortality/default intensities (see
algorithm 2 in Bacinello et al., 2010, for example). The procedure involves the following
steps (we focus on the individual forward rates for convenience):
Step 1. For an arbitrary maturity Ti and ﬁxed rate p
c
i := p
c
Ti
∈ (0, 1), generate M
simulated paths of the state variable process, X, under P˜ along the time grid Ti := {0 <
t1, t2, . . . , tni = Ti}. Denote by S
i,m
tj
the (ex-dividend) MTM value of the swap, and by
29Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) sidestep recursivity issues by considering full collateralization and
symmetric default risk and collateral costs.
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f
i,m
tj
the net payments30 from the swap (excluding collateral ﬂows) at time tj , on path m,
and for given forward rate pci .
Step 2. Compute recursively the approximate31 value S
i,m
tj
of the swap at time tj (for
j = ni − 1, . . . , 0 with t0 = 0) as S
i,m
tj
= β∗i,j · e(X
m
tj
), where e(x) := (e1(x), . . . , eH(x))
T
and {e1, . . . , eH} is a ﬁnite set of functions taken from a suitable basis of L
2(Ω), and β∗i,j
is given by
β∗i,j = arg min
β∈RH
M∑
m=1
{(
S
i,m
tj+1
+ f i,mtj+1
)
exp
(
−
∫ tj+1
tj
rmu du
)
− βe
(
Xmtj
)}2
,
where Si,mtj =
∑ni
h=j+1 exp
(
−
∫ th
tj
(
rmu + Γ
m
u (S
i,m
tj
, . . . , S
i,m
th−1
)
)
du
)
f
i,m
th
is the discounted
cumulative value of the cash-ﬂows originating from the swap allowing for collateral costs,
where the spread Γm depends on the approximations {S
i,m
tj+u
}ni−1u=0 determined in the previ-
ous iterations, which are used to check at each time th−1 whether the collateral thresholds
are triggered and determine the corresponding amount/cost of collateral over the time
interval [th−1, th). The value of the swap at time t0 is then given by
1
M
∑M
m=1 S
i,m
t0
.
Step 3. Iterate32 the above procedure over diﬀerent values for pci until a candidate rate
pc∗i is found, such that the initial price, S
i,m
t0
, is close enough to zero.
Of course, the procedure relies on knowledge of the dynamics of the state variable
process under the pricing measure. To this end, in the next section, we outline a cali-
bration approach based on the joint use of ﬁxed-income data and funding costs / capital
requirements for longevity-linked liabilities.
5 Examples
We use a continuous-time model for the risk-free yield curve, the LIBOR and mortality
rates, as well as for the cost of collateral. The credit risk of party hs is assumed to be equal
30In the case of a Ti-forward contract, we have f
i,m
tj
= 0 for 0 ≤ j < ni, and f
i,m
tj
= n
(
n−1(n−NmTi)− p
c
i
)
for j = ni; compare with expression (2.2).
31The approximation does not take into account default risk and collateral costs over [tj , tj+1), but is
used to determine which party is in-the-money and out-of-the-money (and hence default risk and collateral
costs) in the following step of the recursion.
32In the numerical examples of section 5, we use a combination of bisection, secant, and inverse quadratic
interpolation methods to compute pc∗i (see Forsythe et al., 1976).
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to the average credit quality of the LIBOR panel, so that the TED spread would be party
hs’s default intensity if there were zero recovery upon default (see section 3). We then set
λh = λhs +∆ and consider two cases: party h is either of the same credit quality as party
hs (∆ = 0) or is more credit-risky (∆ > 0).
We describe the evolution of uncertainty by a six-dimensional state variable vector
X with the Gaussian dynamics reported in appendix B. The ﬁrst four components are:
the short rate, r = X(1), assumed to revert to the long-run central tendency factor X(2),
representing the slope of the risk-free yield curve; the TED spread X(3), so that the LIBOR
rate is given by X(1) + X(3); and the net yield on collateral in the interest-rate swap
market, X(4). The latter factor is used to draw a comparison with the cost of collateral in
the longevity swap market. The remaining two components describe the opportunity cost
of longevity swap dealers, X(5), and the log-intensity of mortality of a given population,
log µ = X(6). Under the assumption of independence between (X(1), X(2), X(3), X(4)) and
X(6), we can estimate separately the dynamics of the two groups of factors. For the
ﬁrst vector, we rely on the estimates of Johannes and Sundaresan (2007), who use weekly
Treasury and swap data from 1990 to 2002 to obtain the parameter values reported in
table 2. For the intensity exp(X
(6)
t ), we use a continuous-time version of the Lee-Carter
mortality projection model for a cohort of 65-year olds; see appendix B for details.
As a ﬁrst example, we focus on funding costs and simply take δhs = X(3) and δh =
X(3) +∆, meaning that the hedger’s net cost of collateral coincides with its funding costs
net of the short rate (assuming it is rebated), whereas the hedger’s net yield on the col-
lateral amounts posted by party hs coincides with the TED spread. Assuming that the
pricing formula uses information on the collateral costs of the counterparty, an alternative
interpretation is that each party’s net collateral costs coincide with their borrowing costs
net of the risk-free rate. In the case of asymmetric default risk, we consider values of 100
and 200 basis points for ∆.
We compute the longevity swap rates for a 25-year swap written on a population of
10,000 US males aged 65 at the beginning of 2008. In ﬁgure 4, we plot the underlying for-
ward rates obtained for diﬀerent collateralization rules against the percentiles of survival
rate improvements based on Lee-Carter forecasts. We see that margins are positive and
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increasing with payment maturity in the case of symmetric default risk, for both uncol-
lateralized and fully collateralized transactions. As soon as we introduce asymmetry in
default risk (∆ > 0), however, margins widen in the case of no collateralization, reﬂecting
the fact that the hedger needs to pay an additional premium on account of its higher credit
risk. In the case of full collateralization, counterparty risk is neutralized, but the hedger
is compensated for her higher funding costs and the positive dependence between funding
costs and collateral amounts discussed before: equilibrium swap rates are pushed lower and
produce a negative margin on best estimate swap rates.
< Table 2 about here >
In ﬁgure 5, we examine the swap margins induced by one-way collateralization in the
case of asymmetric default risk. When only the hedge supplier has to post full collateral,
forward rates are higher than best estimate survival probabilities, meaning that the hedger
has to compensate the hedge supplier for bearing both the cost of risk mitigation and
the hedger’s higher default risk. The opposite is true when it is the hedger who has to
post full collateral when out-of-the money. In this case, swap margins are clearly negative,
and decreasing in payment maturity. These eﬀects are ampliﬁed when the asymmetry in
counterparties’ credit quality is greater, as can be seen from the spreads reported in table 3
for some key maturities and collateralization rules.
Plotting the swap rate margins against best estimate mortality improvements allows
one to interpret the swap rates as outputs of a pricing functional based on adjustments to
a reference mortality model (which is common practice in longevity space; see Biﬃs et al.,
2010). On the other hand, longevity swap spreads are easier to compare with those emerging
in other transactions. In table 4, we make a comparison with the interest-rate swap spreads
implied by our parameterization of the state vector (X(1), X(2), X(3), X(4)). In particular,
we report the diﬀerence between interest-rate futures prices (obtained by considering full
collateralization and setting the cost of collateral equal to the risk-free rate) and interest-
rate forward rates for collateralized transactions with collateral costs equal to the funding
costs of the counterparties. Spreads are negative, in line with the intuition that interest
rate risk leads to a discount for the payer of the ﬁxed rate, as discussed in the introduction,
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and are of a magnitude consistent with the ﬁndings of Johannes and Sundaresan (2007).
The results show that longevity swap spreads are comparable with, and often much smaller
(in absolute value) than, those found in the interest-rate swap market. For example, in the
case of bilateral full collateralization, longevity forward rates for 15- to 25-year maturities
embed a spread substantially smaller than that of interest-rate forwards of corresponding
maturity. In the case of one-way collateralization on the hedger’s side, in interest-rate
forward rates we ﬁnd a discount (negative spread) that turns into a premium (positive
spread) of comparable size in the corresponding longevity swap, due to the additional and
opposite eﬀect of longevity risk on swap rates. Our ﬁndings are robust to the choice of
maturity, collateralization rules, and counterparty credit quality, and are mainly driven
by two eﬀects: i) the diﬀerent nature of the risk underlying the swap, a survival curve in
the case of longevity swaps, and a ﬂoating rate in the case of interest-rate swaps; ii) the
fact that interest rate risk and longevity risk impact longevity swap margins in opposite
directions, thus diluting the overall eﬀect of collateralization on longevity swap rates.
< Table 3 about here >
< Table 4 about here >
< Figure 3 about here >
< Figure 4 about here >
In a second example, we focus on the opportunity cost of selling additional longevity
protection. As we do not have any publicly available transaction data from the longevity
swap market to calibrate X(5), we simulate the capital charges arising from holding a
representative longevity-linked liability in response to changes in the evolution of the factors
(X(1), . . . , X(4)) and X(6). We therefore ‘synthesize’ the realizations of X(5) by using
information on regulatory requirements to quantify the capital charges accruing to the
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counterparties during the life of the swap. In particular, we use the following bottom-up
procedure:
Step 1: We simulate several paths of the factors X(1), . . . , X(4) and X(6) along a time
grid Tˆ := {t1, t2, . . . , tk} (with tk = Tˆ > t1 > 0) and under the pricing measure P˜. Again,
for our example, we assume the P˜-dynamics of X(6) to be the same as under the physical
measure.
Step 2: The paths simulated in the previous step are used to compute, at each date
t ∈ Tˆ , the regulatory capital needed by an insurer to hold the liability n − Nt+T , where
T < Tˆ is a representative maturity proxying the average duration of longevity-linked
liabilities in the longevity swap market. We use T = 15 and Tˆ = 40 (years) for our
example. To compute the capital requirements, we use the Solvency II framework, which is
based on the 99.5% value-at-risk of the net assets over a one-year horizon. For simplicity,
we assume holders of longevity exposures to be invested in cash. The distribution of the
one-year-ahead market-consistent value of the liability usually requires nested simulation,
unless a simpliﬁed approach is adopted. In our setting, market-consistent discount factors
can be computed analytically based on the one-year-ahead simulated realizations, as the
pair (X(1), X(2)) is an aﬃne process. We use the LSMC approach (see section 4.3) to
determine the expected number of survivors.33
Step 3: We use the simulated capital charges obtained in the previous step to compute
the gains/costs incurred to reduce/increase capital at each time step along each simulated
path. We assume that capital charges are funded at the counterparties’ funding cost, plus
a spread of 6%34 to reﬂect the opportunity cost of diverting to an individual liability funds
that could be used to support insurance business at the aggregate level. The simulated
realizations of the opportunity cost of capital (see ﬁgure 7 for an example) are used to
estimate the dynamics of X(5) reported in the appendix. The parameter estimates are
included in table 2.
In the case of symmetric collateralization, we ﬁnd results comparable with those ob-
tained by using the counterparties’ funding costs for the process δ. However, ﬁgure 6 shows
33See Stevens et al. (2010) for other approximation methods in the context of Lee-Carter forecasts.
34This is a reasonable, conservative value for the return on capital of longevity swaps dealers: anecdotal
evidence suggests that it can be twice as large.
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that margins increase (decrease) considerably when one-way collateralization on the hedge
supplier’s (hedger’s) side is considered. This is because the party required to post collateral
explicitly takes into account tail events in computing collateral costs, whereas in ﬁgure 5
funding costs where computed on the basis of the market value of the longevity swap.
Finally, we study the sensitivity of longevity forward spreads to the volatility of the
net collateral cost X(5). To close oﬀ the interest-rate risk channel, we ﬁx the factors
X(1), X(2) equal to their long-run means. Table 5 reports the results obtained for diﬀerent
values of the volatility parameter σ5 in the case of symmetric default risk and bilateral full
collateralization. We see that spreads increase dramatically for large values of the volatility
parameter, but are comparable with those found in the previous examples for reasonable
volatility levels (i.e., below 5%).
< Table 4 about here >
< Figure 5 about here >
< Figure 6 about here >
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have provided a framework for understanding and quantifying the cost
of bilateral default risk and collateral strategies on longevity risk solutions. The results
address the concerns aired by potential hedgers regarding how to measure the trade-oﬀ
between the hedge eﬀectiveness of longevity-linked instruments and the counterparty risk
they entail. We have described a methodology for pricing longevity swaps that explicitly
takes into account the dynamics of the marking-to-market process, the collateral ﬂows
it generates, and the costs associated with the posting of collateral. We have shown how
collateral strategies can mitigate if not eliminate counterparty risk, but inevitably introduce
an extra cost that must be borne by the hedge supplier or by the hedger, depending on how
their credit quality and collateral costs compare with each other. Our most signiﬁcant and
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useful ﬁnding is that the overall cost of the collateralization strategies in the longevity swap
market is comparable with, and often smaller than, that found in the much more liquid
interest-rate swap market. Hence, there is no reason to suppose that counterparty risk
will provide an insurmountable barrier to the further development of the longevity swap
market. Our analysis accordingly provides a robust framework for comparing the costs
of credit enhancement in bespoke longevity swaps with the beneﬁts oﬀered by competing
solutions such as securitization and indexed swaps.
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A Details on the setup
We take as given a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P), and model the death times
in a population of n individuals (annuitants or pensioners) as stopping times τ1, . . . , τn.
This means that at each time t the information carried by Ft allows us to state whether
each individual has died or not. The hedger’s liability is given by the random variable∑n
i=1 1{τ i>T}, which can be equivalently written as n−
∑n
i=1 1{τ i≤T} = n−NT . We assume
that death times coincide with the ﬁrst jumps of n conditionally Poisson processes with
common random intensity of mortality (µt)t≥0 under both P and an equivalent martingale
measure P˜ (see Biﬃs et al., 2010, for details). The expected number of survivors over
[0, T ] under the two measures can then be expressed as EP
[∑n
i=1 1{τ i>T}
]
= npT and
EP˜
[∑n
i=1 1{τ i>T}
]
= np˜T , with pT and p˜T given by the expectation (2.1) computed under
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the relevant probability measure.
Consider any stopping time τ i satisfying the above assumptions, an integrable random
variable Y ∈ FT and a bounded process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] such that each Xt is measurable with
respect to Ft−, the information available up to, but not including, time t. Then a security
paying Y at time T in case τ i > T and Xτ i at time τ
i in case τ i ≤ T has time-zero price
EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + µt)dt
)
Xsµsds+ exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + µt)dt
)
Y
]
.
Consider now two stopping times τ i, τ j , with intensities µi, µj , jointly satisfying the above
assumptions (i.e., they are the ﬁrst jump times of the components of a bivariate condition-
ally Poisson process). A security paying Y at time T in case neither stopping time has
occurred (i.e., min(τ i, τ j) > T ) and Xt in case the ﬁrst occurrence is at time t ∈ (0, T ]
(i.e., t = min(τ i, τ j)) has time-zero price given by the same formula, with µt replaced by
µit+µ
j
t . This follows from the fact that the stopping time min(τ
i, τ j) is the ﬁrst jump time
of a conditionally Poisson process with intensity (µit+µ
j
t )t≥0 (e.g., Bielecki and Rutkowski,
2002). The expressions presented in sections 2-4 all follow from these simple results.
Proof of expression (4.2). Let (δht )t≥0 denote the hedger’s net cost of posting collateral
and (δhst )t≥0 the net yield on the collateral amounts received from party hs, meaning that
holding collateral of amount Ct provides the hedger with an instantaneous yield equal to
δhst C
+
t − δ
h
t C
−
t . We assume that collateral is bounded and Ct is measurable with respect
to Ft− for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Parties h and hs are assumed to have death (default) times
satisfying the properties reviewed above, in particular having intensities λh, λhs. Recalling
the recovery rules described in section 4, we can then write:
S0 =E
P˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + λ
h
t + λ
hs
t )dt
)(
P − pd
)]
+ EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + λ
h
t + λ
hs
t )dt
)(
λhs (S
+
s − C
−
s ) + λ
hs
s (C
+
s − S
−
s )
)
ds
]
+ EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + λ
h
t + λ
hs
t )dt
)
(δhss C
+
s − δ
h
sC
−
s )ds
]
.
Using representation (4.1), the amount recovered by the nondefaulting counterparty at
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time τ = min(τh, τhs) ≤ T is
1{τ=τh}Sτ−(c
h
τ 1{Sτ−<0} + 1{Sτ−≥0}) + 1{τ=τhs}Sτ−(c
hs
τ 1{Sτ−≥0} + 1{Sτ−<0}),
where we see that ch, chs replace the recovery rates ψh, ψhs introduced in section 3. We
can then write
S0 =E
P˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + λ
h
t + λ
hs
t )dt
)(
P − pd
)]
+ EP˜
[∫ T
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
0
(rt + λ
h
t + λ
hs
t )dt
)(
λhs + (λ
hs
s + δ
hs
s )c
hs
s )S
+
s − (λ
hs
s + (λ
h
s + δ
h
s )c
h
s )S
−
s
)
ds
]
=EP˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rt + Γt)dt
)(
P − pd
)]
,
which is nothing other than the usual risk-neutral valuation formula for a security with
terminal payoﬀ ST = P − p
d paying continuously a dividend equal to a fraction
(λhs + (λ
hs
s + δ
hs
s )c
hs
s )1{St−≥0} + (λ
hs
s + (λ
h
s + δ
h
s )c
h
s )1{St−<0}
of the security’s market value an instant before each t ∈ [0, T ]. Subtracting the dividend
rate from λh + λhs and rearranging terms we obtain expression (4.2) for Γ.
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B Details on the numerical examples
The numerical examples are based on a six-dimensional state variable processX = (X(1), . . . , X(6))T
having P˜-dynamics
dX
(1)
t =
(
k1(X
(2)
t −X
(1)
t )− η1
)
dt+ σ1dW
(1)
t
dX
(2)
t =
(
k2(θ2 −X
(2)
t )− η2
)
dt+ σ2dW
(2)
t
dX
(3)
t =
(
κ3(θ3 −X
(3)
t ) + κ3,1(X
(1)
t − θ2) + κ3,4(X
(4)
t − θ4)− η3
)
dt+ σ3dW
(3)
t
dX
(4)
t =
(
κ4(θ4 −X
(4)
t ) + κ4,1(X
(1)
t − θ2) + κ4,2(X
(2)
t − θ2)− η4
)
dt+ σ4dW
(4)
t
dX
(5)
t =
(
κ5(θ5 −X
(5)
t ) + κ5,1(X
(1)
t − θ2) + κ5,2(X
(2)
t − θ2) + κ5,3(X
(3)
t − θ3)
+ κ5,4(X
(4)
t − θ4) + κ5,6(X
(6)
t − E0[X
(6)
t ])− η5
)
dt+ σ5dW
(5)
t
dX
(6)
t =
(
Ax(t) +Bx(t)(X
(6)
t − ax(t))
)
dt+ σ6(t, x)dW
(6)
t ,
whereW = (W (1), . . . ,W (6))T is a standard P˜-Brownian motion, the constants ηi represent
market prices of risk, x is the age of a reference cohort of individuals at time 0, and
Ax(·), Bx(·), σ6(·, x) are functions characterizing the dynamics of X
(6)
t = X
(6)
t,x (see below
for explicit deﬁnitions). The P-dynamics are obtained by removing the market prices of risk
from the drifts of the relevant factors and replacing the innovations with the corresponding
P-Brownian innovations. We assume that X(6) has the same dynamics under the physical
and the pricing probability measures, consistent with our baseline case of a swap rate equal
to pT for each T in the absence of collateral. The Brownian innovations are uncorrelated,
with the exception of the pair (W (1),W (2)), whose instantaneous correlation is denoted by
ρ1,2.
For the ﬁrst four factors, we use data from Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) who rely on
a two-stage maximum likelihood procedure based on weekly data sampled on Wednesdays,
from 1990 to 2002, and set the long-run mean of X(3) equal to the average of the 3-month
TED spread over the sampling period. For the log-intensity X(6), we use the mortality
model described below, and assume that the Brownian component W (6) is uncorrelated
with the other ones. The intensity of mortality is modeled using a continuous-time version
of the Lee-Carter model (see Biﬃs and Denuit, 2006; Biﬃs et al., 2010). We ﬁrst use the
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annual central death rates {my,s} for US males from the Human Mortality Database to
estimate the model my,s = exp(α(y) + β(y)Ks) for dates s = 1961, 1962, . . . , 2007 and
ages y = 20, 21, . . . , 89 with Singular Value Decomposition (see Lee and Carter, 1992).
The resulting estimates for K are then ﬁtted with the process Ks+1 = δKKs + σKε, with
ε ∼ N(0, 1). For ﬁxed age x = 65, the estimates for {αˆ(x + h), βˆ(x + h)}h=0,1,... are
interpolated with diﬀerentiable functions ax(t), bx(t). The functions Ax, Bx, σ6 are ﬁnally
obtained by setting Ax(t) = a
′
x(t) + bx(t)δK , Bx(t) = b
′
x(t)bx(t)
−1 and σ6(t, x) = bx(t)σK .
As we consider a single cohort aged x at the reference date 0, here and throughout the paper
we simply write X
(6)
t := X
(6)
t,x . The extension to multiple (say l) cohorts, would require the
analysis of the vector of log-intensities (X
(6)
t,x1
, . . . , X
(6)
t,xl
). Although the drift and volatility
parameters would be diﬀerent for each X
(6)
t,xi
, the Lee-Carter speciﬁcation assumes that all
cohorts are aﬀected by the same Brownian component W (6). Other models may instead
require the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty.
To estimate the dynamics of X(5), the component of collateral costs related to longevity
risk, we implement the procedure discussed in section 5, setting the duration T of the rep-
resentative liability equal to 15. We simulate forward all of the other state variables, and at
each time step we compute the opportunity cost of capital arising from the capital charges
accruing to the hedge supplier based on the simulated mortality and market conditions.
The expectation appearing in the drift of X(5) ensures that the longevity capital charges
react to departures of realized mortality from the term structure of survival rates estimated
at inception. We assume that funding occurs at the LIBOR rate plus a ﬁxed spread of 6%,
a conservative value for the cost of internal capital. To obtain the net cost of collateral,
we take into account the rebate of the risk-free rate. We estimate the parameters for the
dynamics of X(5) based on the simulated realizations of X(5) (an example is depicted in
ﬁgure 7). The parameter estimates are obtained by regressing the simulated dynamics of
X(5) on the simulated vector of state variables (X(1), X(2), X(3), X(4), X(6)). We simulate
10, 000 paths over 40 years on a semi-annual grid. For each simulation, we set the param-
eter θ5 equal to the average of X
(5) along the simulated path. The regression estimates
obtained for each simulated path are averaged across all simulations to obtain the ﬁnal
values reported in table 2.
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C Tables and figures
Date Hedger Size Term (yrs) Type Interm./supplier
Jan 2008 Lucida N.A. 10 indexed JP Morgan
ILS funds
Jul 2008 Canada Life GBP 500m 40 bespoke JP Morgan
ILS funds
Feb 2009 Abbey Life GBP 1.5bn run-oﬀ bespoke Deutsche Bank
ILS funds / Partner Re
Mar 2009 Aviva GBP 475m 10 bespoke Royal Bank
of Scotland
Jun 2009 Babcock GBP 750m 50 bespoke Credit Suisse
International Paciﬁc Life Re
Jul 2009 RSA GBP 1.9bn run-oﬀ bespoke Goldman Sachs
(Rothesay Life)
Dec 2009 Berkshire Council GBP 750m run-oﬀ bespoke Swiss Re
Feb 2010 BMW UK GBP 3bn run-oﬀ bespoke Deutsche Bank
Paternoster
Dec 2010 Swiss Re USD 50m 8 indexed ILS funds
(Kortis bond)
Feb 2011 Pall (UK) GBP 70m 10 indexed JP Morgan
Pension Fund
Aug 2011 ITV GBP 1.7bn N.A. bespoke Credit Suisse
Nov 2011 Rolls Royce GBP 3bn N.A. bespoke Deutsche Bank
Dec 2011 British Airways GBP 1.3bn N.A. bespoke Goldman Sachs
bespoke (Rothesay Life)
Jan 2012 Pilkington GBP 1bn N.A. bespoke Legal & General
Apr 2012 Berkshire Council GBP 100m run-oﬀ bespoke Swiss Re
Table 1: Publicly announced longevity swap transactions 2008-2012.
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κ1 0.969 η1 -0.053 σ1 0.008 UK
κ2 0.832 η3 -0.014 σ2 0.155 δK -0.888
κ3 1.669 η4 0.007 σ3 0.009 σK 1.156
κ4 0.045 η5 0.055 σ4 0.010 US
κ5 0.990 κ5,1 0.147 σ5 0.690 δK -0.761
κ3,1 -0.163 κ5,2 1.340 θ2 0.046 σK 1.078
κ4,1 0.114 κ5,3 2.509 θ3 0.003
κ3,4 0.804 κ5,4 -0.133 θ4 0.007
κ4,2 -0.038 κ5,6 -0.002 θ5 0.115 ρ1,2 -0.036
Table 2: Parameter values for the dynamics of X given in Appendix B. As in Johannes and Sundaresan
(2007), we set the parameter η2 equal to zero. The estimates for X
(5) are based on the assumption
that capital increases are funded by counterparties at 6% plus the LIBOR rate.
Maturity ch = 0 ch = 0 ch = 1 ch = 1
λh = λhs +∆ payment chs = 0 chs = 1 chs = 0 chs = 1
δh = δhs +∆ (yrs) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps)
15 0.03 11.34 -11.76 0.05
∆ = 0 20 1.11 19.93 -17.94 0.86
25 1.50 21.25 -18.35 1.24
15 5.45 16.79 -17.29 -5.84
∆ = 100 bps 20 10.16 28.95 -27.08 -8.23
25 10.96 30.75 -27.76 -9.19
15 11.30 22.29 -22.90 -11.25
∆ = 200 bps 20 19.26 38.06 -36.16 -17.42
25 19.46 40.27 -37.02 -18.38
Table 3: Forward rate spreads pcTi − pTi (in basis points) for different collateralization rules, maturities
and spread ∆ ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.02}. The LSMC procedure uses 5000 paths over a quarterly grid with
polynomial basis functions of order 3, and is repeated for 100 seeds.
IRS (δhs = X(4)) Longevity (δhs = X(3))
λh = λhs +∆ Maturity ch = 0 ch = 1 ch = 1 ch = 0 ch = 1 ch = 1
δh = δhs +∆ payment chs = 1 chs = 0 chs = 1 chs = 1 chs = 0 chs = 1
(yrs) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps)
15 -7.96 -44.97 -52.86 11.34 -11.76 0.05
∆ = 0 20 -12.68 -42.64 -56.22 19.93 -17.94 0.86
25 -17.94 -40.98 -58.92 21.25 -18.35 1.24
15 -8.00 -67.87 -75.23 16.79 -17.29 -5.84
∆ = 100 bps 20 -12.65 -63.84 -77.42 28.95 -27.08 -8.23
25 -17.65 -60.63 -77.64 30.75 -27.76 -9.19
Table 4: Comparison of interest-rate swaps (IRSs) with longevity swaps. The IRS spreads represent the
difference betweeen the futures prices (the opportunity cost of collateral coincides with the risk-
free rate for both parties) and the forward rate for a collateralized transaction (for different
collateralization rules, maturities, and credit risk).
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σ5 p25 p
c spread (bps)
0.0005 0.201425 0.201469 2.15
0.0100 0.201425 0.201822 19.68
0.0150 0.201425 0.202009 28.96
0.0200 0.201425 0.202196 38.26
0.1000 0.201425 0.205237 189.24
0.1500 0.201425 0.207184 285.90
Table 5: Sensitivity with respect to parameter σ5: we compute 25-year forward rates and spreads (in
basis points) under full collateralization by setting X(1), X(2) equal to their long run means. The
baseline estimated parameter values for the dynamics of X(5) are θ5 = 0.000254, κ5 = 1.005073,
σ5 = 0.000542, η5 = 0.000269, κ53 = 0.003648, κ54 = 0.000018, κ56 = 0.000261.
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Figure 1: Survival curves computed at the beginning of year t = 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 for England &Wales
males aged 65 + t − 1980 in year t. Forecasts are based on the Lee-Carter mortality projection
model using the latest Human Mortality Database data available at the beginning of each year
t.
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Figure 2: Mark-to-market value of the longevity swap in the baseline case and with the credit spread of
counterparty hs widening by 50 and 100 basis points over 1988-2005. In the absence of default,
the net payments from the swap are insensitive to credit spread changes.
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Figure 3: Change in longevity swap MTM relative to the baseline case and to the net payments from
the swap, when the credit spread of counterparty hs widens by 50 and 100 basis points over
1988-2005.
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Figure 4: Swap margins pcTi/pTi − 1 computed for different maturities {Ti} and collateral rules, with δ
h =
λh, δhs = δh + ∆, and λh = λhs + ∆, with ∆ = 0 (dashed lines) or ∆ = 0.01 (solid lines):
no collateral (squares), full collateralization (circles). The underlying is a cohort of 10,000 US
males aged 65 at the beginning of 2008. Forward rates are plotted against the percentiles of
improvements in survival rates based on Lee-Carter forecasts.
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Figure 5: Swap margins pcTi/pTi − 1 computed for different maturities {Ti} and collateral rules, with δ
h =
λh, δhs = δh + 0.01, and λh = λhs + 0.01: no collateral (squares), full collateralization (circles),
full collateral posted only by party h (stars) or party hs (diamonds). The underlying is a cohort
of 10,000 US males aged 65 at the beginning of 2008. Forward rates are plotted against the
percentiles of improvements in survival rates based on Lee-Carter forecasts.
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Figure 6: Swap margins pcTi/pTi − 1 computed for different maturities {Ti} and collateral rules, with λ
h =
λhs and δh = δhs = X(5), where the parameter estimates for the dynamics of X(5) are given
in table 2. Collateral rules: no collateral (squares), full collateralization (circles), full collateral
posted only by party h (stars) or hs (diamonds). Forward rates are plotted against the percentiles
of improvements in survival rates based on Lee-Carter forecasts (65-year old US males in 2008).
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Figure 7: A simulated path of the capital charges accruing to the longevity swap dealer holding a repre-
sentative longevity-linked liability n−Nt+T under the Solvency II regulatory framework.
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